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Ignoring History: The Liability of
Ships' Masters, Innkeepers and
Stablekeepers Under Roman Law
by

DAVID

S.

BOGEN*

Roman law is rarely taught in American law schools, although
it has had an unequalled impact on the legal systems of the world.
Contemporary issues dominate the elective curriculum-gender, race,
the environment, and the impact of technological change together with
responses to those problems in the legal clinic practice and jurisprudential
theory. 1 But any attempt to deal with today's problems without an
historical sense threatens to compound the errors of the past. Proposals
to change or retain laws may be misdirected when they focus on
contemporary justifications without considering history. Roman law
illustrates some of the difficulties created by ignoring history, while
it also provides perspective on the common law and examples for studies
in legal reasoning. This paper deals with one small issue of Roman
law that provides such an object lesson-the confusion and conflict
in the Digest on the obligations of ships' masters, innkeepers, and
stablekeepers.
The preeminent source for our knowledge of Roman law is
Justinian's Digest. 2 It devoted two of its four hundred thirty-two titles
to actions against ships' masters, innkeepers and stablekeepers.J
However, the provisions in those titles seem to conflict. One passage
says that innkeepers and ships' masters are liable for the acts of their
customers, but another passage says that they are not. One passage
*Professor, University of Maryland School of Law, Baltimore, Md. Tony Weir
commented on an earlier draft of this piece during a brief visit at Maryland, saving
the author from untold mistakes, but he cannot be held responsible for those that remain.
I have also profited from the advice of my colleagues Oscar Gray, Alan Hornstein,
Mark Sargent, Ted Tomlinson and Gordon Young. Tracy Downing, Celeste Hunter
Robinson and John Connolly served as research assistants.
I. Even English legal history, the fount of the American legal system, receives only
incidental mention in most of legal education.
2. The Digest of Justinian, (4 vols.; translation edited by Alan Watson with Latin
text edited by Theodor Mommsen with the aid of Paul Krueger; Philadelphia: University
of Pennsylvania Press, 1985). Like Tribonian, Watson directed a group of scholars in
this effort, and there are distinct differences in style among them.
3. D. 4.9 and D. 47.5. Citations to Justinian's Digest are traditionally made with
the abbreviation D. and the numbers of book, title, fragment, and paragraph. The first
paragraph is the principium abbreviated pr., so § I is really the second paragraph. Other
titles in the Digest also deal with ships' masters, innkeepers and stablekeepers, but they
either make only passing references (D.l9.2.13.1,2; D.l9.2.31; D.l9.5.1; D.44.7.5.6;
47.2.14.17) or focus entirely on ships' masters (D.l4.1,2).
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states that innkeepers must accept travelers while another says that
innkeepers may choose whether to receive them. This article attempts
to unravel these contradictions. It concludes that the lack of any
authoritative rule on· the obligation of innkeepers to serve the public
led to the inconsistent Digest statements. The confusion resulted from
attempts to give reasons for the variety of legal rules on ships' masters,
innkeepers and stablekeepers without considering the historical
development of those rules.
I. A Note on Historical Development

Ronian law is the law of an entity that changes over a thousand
year period from a small city ruled by a king to a growing republic
to an empire surrounding the Mediterranean sea. The law also changed
significantly, and some knowledge of its historical development is
necessary to understand the conflict in the texts.
The first record of Roman law is the Twelve Tables-a record
of customary law from about 450 B. C. of which only fragments survive. 4
Private citizens enforced obligations under this law by making a claim
before the magistrate, or praetor, an official elected annually. The praetor
decided whether the plaintiffs claim was in the correct form derived
from the Twelve Tables and appointed the judge or judges to hear
it. These actions pursuant to the promulgated law were called legis
actiones.s Later statutes, such as the lex Aquilia of 286 B.C. which
introduced a more comprehensive system of law on injury to property,
also provided for enforcement by legis actiones.6 But decisions under
the legis actiones became technical and lacked the flexibility to deal
with new situations. During the second century B.C., the praetor was
freed from the constraints of the legis actiones and issued his own form
which framed the issue for the judge or iudex, who was bound by
the terms of the praetor's formula. Ultimately, the praetor issued
formulae for new causes of action and might even refuse to grant a
formula for a statutorily based claim which he thought unfair.7 The
praetor's behavior might be analogized to the English courts of Equity
which did not challenge the validity of the common law, but developed
new remedies which were unavailable at common law or enjoined persons
from pursuing common law remedies. Unlike the English Equity court,
the Roman praetor faced no competition for business from other courts
and his decisions became central to Roman private law.
4. Wolfgang Kunkel, An Introduction to Roman Legal and Constitutional History
(trans. J.M. Kelly, 2d ed.; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973) p. 23. See 0.1.2.4. Book
One of the Digest is on the Origin of Law. It provides some institutional history of
Roman law, but provides little in the way of doctrine.
5. The Institutes of Gaius (trans. W.M. Gordon and O.F. Robinson from Latin
text of Seckel and Kuebler; Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988) p. 407 [IV.ll.].
6. Kunkel, supra note 4 at 31. See 0.9.2.
7. Kunkel, supra note 4 at 85-91; Gaius, supra note 5 at 427 [IV:30].
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On taking office, praetors announced in an "edict" the principles
of law they would follow. Although each praetor was bound to follow
his own edict, the next praetor could promulgate a different rule.
Nevertheless, successive praetors usually adopted most of the principles
of their predecessors. Around 130 A.D., the Emperor Hadrian instructed
Salvius Julianus to consolidate the edicts of the praetors into a single
edict, which could be changed only by the emperor.s Although the
original text of Julian's revision of the edict has been lost, Professor
Otto Lenel reconstructed it. This reconstruction has been widely accepted
despite criticism of some particulars.9
The praetors rarely had legal training, but they could get advice
from private individuals trained in the law. Litigants also could request
advice from these jurists. Some of the jurists' responses eventually became part of the Digest; for example, Alfenus reported responses of
Servius Sulpicius Rufus in the first century B.C.JO By that time, the
jurists not only responded to actual cases, but created and discussed
hypotheticals as well. 11 Developing out of this tradition, jurists began
to write extensive commentaries on the interpretation and application
of the laws. By the beginning of the third century A.D., Ulpian and
others wrote commentaries that included extensive references to the
work of previous jurists. Such commentary became particularly useful
as the Roman legal system became an imperial bureaucracy.
The two-stage proceeding of obtaining a formula from the praetor
which told the judge what issues to decide was gradually replaced by
the cognitio, a unitary procedural system in which the magistrate heard
the whole case. Despite changes in procedure and new laws promulgated
by the Emperor, the commentaries from earlier periods remained
essential expositions of the law's substance. Multiple copies of the most
popular works were made by scribes. They were consulted by government
officials and studied in schools. These commentaries were not historical
curiosities, but living guides that needed constant revision. Like
subsequent editions of Blackstone, Kent, Story and Williston where
the original author's name becomes part of the title and the later editors
get little recognition, new editions of the classical Roman jurists gave
8. R.W. Leage, Roman Private Law (3d ed. A.M. Prichard; New York: St. Martin's
Press, 1967) pp. 21-30. Kunkel, supra note 4 at 90-94. The date of 131 A.D. is often
given for Julian's completion of the edict, but Honore suggests that it is an open question.
Tony Honore, Gaius (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962) pp. 54-55.
9. Otto Lenel, Das £dictum Perpetuum (Leipzig: B. Tauchnitz, 1927). Lenel's
reconstruction contained at least 292 entries. For an English translation of the Perpetual
Edict, see Ancient Roman Statutes (trans. Allan Chester Johnson, Paul Robinson
Coleman-Norton, Frank Card Bourne; Austin: University of Texas Press, 1961) pp. 18395.
10. 0.19.2.31.
II. See Bruce W. Frier, The Rise of the Roman Jurists (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1985).
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little credit to the later editors (who may not have completely understood
the original author). Users might add notes or revisions on the original
papyrus, which might in turn be copied as part of the manuscript with
no indication that they were not part of the original. Additions to and
alterations of the original text are called "interpolations. " 12 These texts
from the classical era as they passed through 300 years of anonymous
revision were the primary authorities excerpted in the Digest.
In 530 A.D., the Emperor Justinian commanded his quaestor
Tribonian and other legal scholars under Tribonian's direction to compile
in fifty short books a single work out of the writings of ancient
authorities.B The scholars were directed to excerpt the old works to
eliminate repetition, obsolete discussion, and inconsistency. They were
to correct mistakes of the authorities and improve their expression. 14
They completed their task in 3 years, condensing more than 3,000,000
lines into a work of 150,000 lines.'5 The fifty books of the Digest were
subdivided into titles for each subject treated. Within each title, the
compilers placed fragments from various authors with inscriptions
naming the author and the book where the statements had been found.t6
Justinian then commanded that this Digest have the force of law. Any
texts not contained in the Digest could not be offered in argument
in court. Ultimately nearly all the works of the old authorities on Roman
12. See H.F. Jolowicz, Historical Introduction to the Study of Roman Law (2d
ed., Cambridge: University Press, 1954 reprinted 1961) p. 497-98; Fritz Schulz, History
of Roman Legal Science (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963) p. 142; and Kunkel, supra
note 4 at 137. Severe internal and external crises wracked the empire for much of the
third century A.D., ending in an absolute monarchy. In 395 A.D., the empire was divided
into the Eastern Roman empire and the Western empire. The Western empire where
Latin remained the dominant language moved away from the classical system of Roman
law which prevailed in the beginning of the third century A.D. The classical law was
preserved in the east where the law schools flourished, but Greek was the language of
the Eastern empire. The two empires were united once more under Justinian, only to
dissolve upon his death. Max Kaser, Roman Private Law (trans. Rolf Dannenbring,
2d ed. Durban: Butterworths, 1968) pp. 3-5.
13. A book originally was a scroll. The book with a spine and pages came into
general use in the third century A.D. Justinian's Institutes (trans. Peter Birks & Grant
McLeod with Latin text of Paul Krueger; Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987) p.
9. Most of the ancient authorities were classical jurists who wrote in the late second
and early third century. Their books would often have been scrolls of limited length.
But the length of books with pages also remained limited for many years-the Digest
books averaged about three thousand lines each which is 37.5 printed pages in the Watson
edition. In effect, the book was a unit of length in ancient Rome, so Tribonian knew
just how much he would have to condense the material when Justinian told him that
the Digest was to be in fifty books.
14. I Watson, supra note 2 at xlvi-xlix. The scholars were Tribonian, Constantinus,
Theophilus, Dorotheus, Anatolius and Cratinus. They were assisted by eleven named
barristers who also acted as counsel in cases heard before the court in the east. Justinian,
De Confirmatione Digestorum in Watson, supra at lviii-lix.
15. ld. at lvi.
16. /d. at lix.
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law have been lost, and only those selections excerpted in the Digest
have survived.

II. The Conflict in the Digest Texts
Justinian, in his confirmation of the Digest, claimed that it had
no inconsistencies .
. As for any contradiction occurring in this book, none such has found a place
for itself, and none will be discovered by anyone who reflects acutely upon
the modes of diversity. On the contrary, something will be found, even if
obscurely expressed, which removes the objection of inconsistency, gives the ·
matter a different aspect, and passes outside the limits of discrepancy.l 7

Despite this claim, the Digest contains a number of inconsistent passages, including those found in the two separate
titles of the Digest on the liability of nautae, caupones et stabularii
for losses suffered by their customers. "Nautae" are ships; masters.IB
17. /d. at !xi.
. 18. The translation of "nautae" reveals the difficulties in dealing with another
language. There is simply no adequate way to translate nautae in this context. Literally,
it means seamen. But the praetor, the official who issues the edit, made it clear that
a special definition was involved. "The praetor says: 'seamen.' We ought to understand
a seaman to be one who manages the ship, although all are called seamen who are
in the ship in order to sail it. But the praetor is thinking on.ly of the person in charge."
0.4.9.1.2. Geoffrey McCormack, the translator of D.4 in the Watson edition quoted
above, rendered nauta literally as "seaman,'qeaving it in quotes whenever nautareferred
to the special definition above. Unfortunately, "seaman" would lose the sense of vicarious
liability if used in an extended article like this one.
The special definition for nauta in 0.4.9.1.2 says the nauta is one who manages
the ship (qui navem exercet) and that the praetor is thinking only of the person in
charge (de exercitore). There are two candidates for that position-the magister navis
and the exercitor-but neither one alone is satisfactory. Nautae probably includes both
of them together, depending on the structure of authority on the particular trip.
The magister navis is the person in physical charge of the vessel. The exercitor
is "the maritime entrepreneur, the person with the prime economic interest in the ship's
operations, the man who gives orders to the captain." I Watson, supra at 415. Tony
Weir, translator of D.l4, renders exercitor as "shipowner" while explaining that there
is no precise English equivalent for the Latin term, since the exercitor may not in
fact be the owner of the ship. '"Shipowner' in this connection designates the person
to whom all the income and revenues come, even if he does not actually own the
ship: He may have hired it from the owner for a lump sum or for a fixed term or
without limit of time." D.l4.1.1.15.
A separate title of the Digest is devoted to the liability of the exercitor. 0.14.1.
As the person who appoints the magister navis, the exercitor is liable for the agreements
of the captain within the scope of the authority he gave the captain. D.l4.1.1.7. The
exercitor is also liable for the delicts of the crew on board. D.l4.1.1.2. But the Digest
did not limit liability in D.4.9 or D.47.5 to the exercitor. After all, the liability of
the exercitor derives from the magister navis. An action against one bars an action
against the other. D.l4.1.1.24. Furthermore, it is the magister navis who sues and
is sued under the Rhodian law of jettison when cargo is jettisoned to save the ship.
D.14.2.2pr. Finally, the definitions of innkeeper and stablekeeper in 0.4.9 state that
they comprise both those who carry on (exercent) the business of an inn or stable
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"Caupones" are innkeepers. "Stabularii" are stablekeepers.I9
"Let Seamen, Innkeepers, and Stab1ekeepers Restore What They
Have Received" is the caption for title 9 of Digest book 4. The first
fragment under that title establishes the strict liability of ships' masters,
innkeepers and stablekeepers for any damage or loss of their customers'
goods.2o The ship's master is liable for damage or loss resulting from
the acts of the passengers. "[H]e receives for safekeeping all the goods
which have been brought onto the ship and ... he ought to be liable
for the acts not only of the crew but also of the passengers. ''21 The
succeeding fragment adds, "just as an innkeeper is liable for the acts
of travelers. ''22
D.4.9.l.l, the "operator's choice" paragraph, states in part that
and their managers. D.4.9.1.5. The parallel liability of the nautae, caupones and stabularii
suggests a parallel interpretation of the status of persons covered by the terms. Thus,
nauta in both D.4.9 and D.47.5 should be read to include both the exercitor and
the magister navis.
J.A.C. Thomas translated nauta as "ship's master" in the title of 0.47.5. "Ship's
master" is the literal translation of magister navis, but the nauta is not just the magister
navis. Most of the specific references to liability in D.47.5 specify the exercitor navis
rather than the magister navis. Further, nauta must refer to someone other than the
magister navis in D.4.9 because a fragment states that the nauta should only be placed
under an obligation "through his own act or that of the master of the ship." D.4.9.1.2
(emphasis supplied).
Despite problems, this article translates nauta as "ship's master" to indicate the
person or persons with effective charge of the ship. To avoid confusion, where not
quoting another's translation, the article refers to the magister navis as the "captain"
of the ship. Translating magister navis as "captain" is intended to convey the idea
that "ship's master" is a broader term that refers to both the captain (magister navis)
and to the shipowner (exercitor) where the captain acts within his authority.
19. Stabulum carried the dual meaning of stable and inn. The word may have begun
as an inn with a stable, but it lost that restrictive meaning. Ti:innes Kleberg, Hotels, Restaurants
et Cabarets dans L'Antiquite Romaine: Etudes historiques et philologiques (Uppsala:
Almqvist & Wiksells, 1957) pp. 18-19. See also Cassell's Latin Dictionary: Latin-English
and English-Latin, S. V. "Stabulum." "Stabu/ari1~ was variously translated as stable keepers,
liverymen and innkeepers in Watson, supra note 2. "Stabularius"in D.3.2.4.2 was translated
as a keeper of a tavern. Watson, supra note 2 at 83. Other authors also refer to stabularius
as an innkeeper. W.C. Firebaugh, The Inns of Greece & Rome: And a History of Hospitality
from the Dawn of Time to the Middle Ages (Chicago: Pascal Covici, 1928) 119. D.4.9.5pr
speaks of the stabularius receiving payment on account of beasts Uumentum) staying with
him. Kleberg cites Digest 4.9.5 as an example of the use of stabularius as a keeper of
an inn with stables. Kleberg, supra at 28. Nevertheless, the Digest chapters on liability
of nautae, caupones et stabularii, D.4.9 and D. 47.5, translate stabu/arii as stablekeepers
or liverymen. This seems the better translation in focusing on the stable in contrast to
the caupones who operate inns. Much of the same rationale for holding the operator liable
for lost property applies regardless whether the stables are part of the inn or have an
independent identity.
20. D.4.9.1 pr. See also D. 4.9.3.1.
21. D.4.9.1.8. See also D.4.9.3pr.
22. D.4.9.2.
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this strict liability is not too harsh because these businesses decide
whom they will take.
The praetor says: "I will give an action against seamen, innkeepers,
and stablekeepers in respect of what they have received and undertaken to
keep safe, unless they restore it." This edict is of the greatest benefit, because
it is necessary generally to trust these persons and deliver property into their
custody. Let no one think that the obligation placed on them is too strict;
for it is in their own discretion whether to receive anyone.23

One of the puzzles of this passage is the failure of the explanation
to explain. The discretion of the operator of a business to refuse
customers doesn't significantly mitigate the severity of the liability.
Innkeepers and ships' masters often knew very little about the travelers
who asked for their services.2 4 Choice in such constrained
circumstances is not meaningful and provides no foundation for
arguing that the liability is not too strict for the businessman.
The mystery of this explanation is compounded by another Digest
section which denies both the innkeeper's right to refuse customers
and his liability for their behavior. Title 5 of book 47 of the Digest,
captioned "The Action for Theft Against Ships' Masters, Innkeepers,
and Liverymen," sets forth the liability of those persons for theft
committed by their employees, stating that the action is for twofold. 25
But ships' masters are not liable for the behavior of their passengers.
D.47.5.1.6, the "innkeeper's duty" paragraph, states that innkeepers
are liable for thefts committed by their permanent lodgers, but not
for theft by travelers because they cannot exclude the latter.
The innkeeper is answerable for the deeds of those whom he has in
the inn to run the establishment as also of those who reside in the inn;
he is not answerable for the acts of passing travelers. For an innkeeper
or liveryman is not regarded as choosing his own traveler and cannot refuse
those making a journey; but in a way, the innkeeper does select his permanent
residents, since he does not reject them, and so should be answerable for
what they do. In the case of a ship, there is no liability for the acts of
passengers.26

Once more the explanation makes no sense. The distinction
between the traveler and the lodger purportedly shows that the
innkeeper is at fault for thefts committed by a long term lodger and
not for those committed by the traveler. But the ship's master is not
liable for the acts of his passengers although there is no indication
he is bound to accept them. Further, fault is a poor explanation for
double damages, because the employer may have no inkling of the
23. (emphasis supplied) 0.4.9.1 pr.
24. 0.14.1.1 pr. If the traveler knew little about the character of the ship's master
because of the need for haste in making arrangements, the same was likely to be
true of the master's knowledge of the traveler.
25. 0.47.5.lpr,2,6.
26. (emphasis supplied) 0.47.5.1.6.
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character defect of his employees or his permanent lodgers. Finally
, the liability is aberrational, for employers in other businesses do
not have to pay double damages for thefts committed by their
employees. Thus, the distinction between the types of customers the
innkeeper must shelter and those he may refuse does not explain the
imposition of double damages.
In short, the "operator's choice" paragraph and the "innkeeper's
duty" paragraph conflict on the innkeeper's duty to serve the traveler;
they do not justify the liability rules they purportedly explain; and
those liability rules themselves appear inconsistent. The remainder
of this paper attempts to explain the apparent inconsistency in liability
rules, the weaknesses of the explanations for those rules and the conflict
in statements on the innkeeper's duty to accept travelers.
The search for answers to these puzzles leads from the Digest
texts through the historical development of Roman law, the
methodology of the compilers, and the analysis of interpolations which
change the original texts.

III. The Different Rules on Liability for Customer LossesActio Furti Adversus Nautae Caupones Stabularii
and Actio de Recepto
The first puzzle posed by the two titles on the liability of ships'
masters, innkeepers and stablekeepers is why the texts contain different
conditions of liability for customer losses-some saying they are liable
to their customers for thefts committed by other customers while other
passages state they are not liable for the misbehavior of their customers.
The simplest explanation is that the texts refer to different actions.
Confusion arises because characteristics from one action are
included in a title of the Digest apparently devoted to the other. The
solution of this difficulty requires an excursion into the working
methodology of the compilers and a discussion of the problems posed
by the existence of yet a third action which had no separate title,
the actio damni adversus nautas caupones et stabularios [actio damni
a.n.c.s.], an action for damages to goods.

A. Textual Differences Refer to Separate Actions
Most scholars agree that there are at least two separate actionsthe actio furti adversus nautae caupones stabularios [hereinafter actio
furti a.n.c.s.] and the actio de recepto-applicable to the liability of
ships' masters, innkeepers and stablekeepers for losses suffered by
their customers.27 This theory reconciles the conflicting liability rules,
although it does not resolve whether innkeepers could refuse patrons.
27. Ferdinand Mackeldey, Handbook of the Roman Law (trans. Moses A. Dropsie;
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For the most part, the actions are found in different books of
the Digest, dealing with very different concepts. Book 47 deals
primarily with civil wrongs like theft, arson, swindling, defamation
and robbery where the victim was often entitled to a twofold or fourfold
recovery. The actio furti a.n.c.s. is described in title 5 of that book.
It was quasi-delictual and permitted a twofold recovery. The victim
must prove that the goods were stolen by the operator of the business,
his employee, or, in the case of the inn, by a long term lodger. The
justification offered emphasized the fault of the operator of the business
in selecting dishonest employees, but the employee's dishonesty was
conclusive proof of the employer's fault.
On the other hand, book 4 of the Digest deals largely with
restitution. 28 The first several fragments of Title 9 of that book describe
the actio de recepto. That action is more contractual in nature and
recovery is limited to the value of the goods lost or the amount by
which they were damaged. The action was for failure to restore what
had been received. The victim could recover from the operator of
the business for loss even if the goods were stolen by a fellow passenger
or traveler; indeed, the victim could recover ·without knowing how
the goods were lost. Such strict liability could not be justified by
any demonstrated fault of the defendant, but it protected against any
possibility of dishonest operators.
Thus, the ship's master, the innkeeper or the stablekeeper were
liable for damages in the actio de recepto for the acts of a customer
which harmed another customer's goods, but they were not liable
to pay the double damages of the actio furti a.n.c.s. for such acts.
B. The Parallel to Related Actions: The Actio Furti and the
Condictio Furtiva

The perpetrator of a theft also faced two separate actions with
different contours which applied to the same event. The general action
against the thief was called the actio furti. It can be traced to the
Twelve Tables. "The code, so far as can be seen, was in very large
Philadelphia: T. & J.W. Johnson & Co., 1883) p. 361, 378; Rudolph Sohm, The Institutes:
History and System of Roman Private Law (3d ed.; trans. James Crawford Ledlie; Oxford:
Clarendon,Press, 1907 reprinted 1970 by Augustus M. Ketley, New York) p. 411; Paul
Huvelin, Etudes D'Histoire du Droit Commercial Romain (Paris: Librarie du Recueil
Sirey, 1929) pp. 115 et seq.; W.W. Buckland, A Manual of Roman Private Law (2d
ed.; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1939 reprinted 1957) pp. 309, 332; J.A. Crook,
Law and life of Rome (London: The Camelot Press Ltd., 1967) pp. 226-28; R.W. Leage,
supra note 8 at 381, 422; Max Kaser, supra note 12 at 197-98.
28. This is not restitution in a technical sense of the word, but deals with nullifying
an intervening event-"For under this head, the praetor helps men on many occasions
who have made a mistake or been cheated, whether they have incurred loss through
duress or cunning or their youth or absence." 0.4.1.1.
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measure based on the idea of the right of an injured party to private
vengeance. "29 If the thief was not caught in the act, the victim could
obtain a monetary penalty, usually set at double damages.3° Under the
Twelve Tables, if the victim caught the thief in the act, he could bring
the thief before a magistrate who would hand the thief into the power
of the victim to enslave or sell into slavery to foreigners.3 1 Sometime
around the third century B.C., the penalty for manifest theft in the Twelve
Tables was modified by the praetor's edict. 32 "[1]he severity of this penalty
was disapproved and an action for fourfold damages was created in
the praetor's Edict. "33 Perhaps also the edict reflected a common practice
by victims of accepting a ransom instead of killing or enslaving the
thief.34
The actio furti with its twofold or fourfold damages lay only against
the thief and not his heirs. Further, multiple damages were of little effect
against a poor defendant. The owner would normally be satisfied with
return of the property. Indeed, the Twelve Tables provided that the
stolen property belonged to the owner, so the owner could recover it
in addition to collecting the multiple damages.35 The action for
determination that the property belonged to the owner (vindicatio) was
29. Kunkel, supra note 4 at 27.
30. /d. at 28. "When anyone accuses and convicts another of theft which is not manifest,
and no stolen property is found, judgment shall be rendered to compel the thief to pay
double the value of what was stolen." Law 8 of Table II of the Twelve Tables, translated
in Samuel Parsons Scott, Corpus Juris Civilis: The Civil Law, Vol. I (17 vols., Cincinnati:
The Central Trust Company, 1932, reprinted New York: AMS Press, 1973) p. 62. "For
non-manifest theft the Twelve Tables appointed a penalty of double damages, and this
the praetor still retains." The Institutes of Gaius, supra note 5 at 377 [Book III, 190].
31. Kunkel, supra note 4 at 28. The Twelve Tables permit killing for manifest theft
where the theft is committed at night (Table II, Law IV), where the thieves attempt to
defend themselves (Table II, Law VI), or where the thief is a slave (Table II, Law V);
otherwise they provide that thieves be given to the victim as slaves (Table II, Law V).
See Table II of the Twelve Tables, translated in I Scott, supra note 30 at 58-62. Gaius
wrote that "For manifest theft the penalty under the Twelve Tables was capital." Gaius,
supra note 5 at 375 [III, 189]. Kunkel said that the victim of manifest theft could kill
the thief after the magistrate handed the thief over to him. Zulueta said, however, that
"poena capitalis" in Gaius here implied merely loss of status. Francis de Zulueta, The
Institutes of Gaius: Part II Commentary (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1953 reprinted 1963)
p. 201.
32. J.M. Kelly, Roman litigation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966) p. 161.
33. Gaius, supra note 5 at 375-77 [III, 189]. Professor Kelly suggested that the
distinction in furtum between manifestum and nee manifestum was based on the strength
of the proof which explained the difference in penalty. Kelly, supra note 32 at 141-44.
Alternatively, he speculated that quadruple damages were reserved for offenses where
the law had been ineffectual-and that furtum manifestum was either theft committed
in daylight by groups so powerful that they would not submit to law or at night by
thieves devoid of assets. /d. at 161-3.
34. Leage, supra note 8 at 405.
35. Twelve Tables, Table II, Law XI, "Stolen property shall always be his to whom
it formerly belonged." Scott, supra note 30 at 62.
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supplanted by a new action for the value of the property derived from
a more general restitutionary type of action. "By the first century B.C.,
and probably earlier, the condiction became available in cases of outright
theft, provided the owner could express his claim as a claim for a certain
sum, quantity or thing,''36 The owner could sue the thief in a condictio
furtiva for the value of the stolen property.37 This was not a delict,
but a quasi-contractual action serving to prevent unjust enrichment.
The condictio furtiva lay against the thiers heirs to prevent them from
profiting from his wrong.
In sum, the victim of a theft had two options for redress against
the wrongdoer: an action for double damages for theft, the actio furti, 38
and a separate action similar to restitution to recover the value of the
item stolen, the condictio furtiva. If the property belonged to the customer
of a ship's master, innkeeper or stablekeeper, the customer could also
choose between two different actions against the operator of the premises:
the actio furti a.n.c.s. with its double damages or the actio de recepto
for the value of the item which was not restored. These actions forced
the operator to seek reimbursement by bringing the actio furti or
condictio furtiva against the thief.
C. The Placement of Sections Relating to Furti in the Title Devoted

to Actio de Recepto
Most of the confusion over the existence of separate actions arises
from the compilers' failure to keep them separated. 0.47.5 (the Theft
title) is captioned "The Action for Theft Against Ships' Masters,
Innkeepers and Liverymen" and is devoted to the actio furti a.n.c.s.
0.4.9 (the Restoration title) is captioned "Let Seamen, Innkeepers and
Stablekeepers Restore What They Have Received," and it discusses the
actio de recepto. Nevertheless, at least two fragments in the Restoration
title, fragments 6 and 7, refer to the actio furti a.n.c.s. Indeed, despite
Justinian's caution against repetition, virtually every issue discussed in
the Theft title is contained in the last two fragments of the Restoration
title.39 The major difference is that fragments 6 and 7 in the Restoration
36. John P. Dawson, Unjust Enrichment (Boston: Little, Brown and Company,
1951) p. 43.
37. Leage, supra note 8 at 384-86. The owner could also bring a vindicatio where
the stolen property was found. The vindicatio was the older action, but it required the
plaintiff to find and seize the property in question and bring it before the court. The
condictio probably initially developed to deal with fungible property such as money
where the exact property could not be determined, and it was brought to recover the
value of the item. Although in theory all three actions were available to an owner whose
property was stolen, the return of the property would satisfy both vindicatio and condictio.
The greater ease in bringing this action led to its ultimate extension to situations where
the goods were unique. Ultimately, it supplanted the vindicatio.
38. Justinian's Institutes, supra note 13 at 129 [Book IV, Title V, §3].
39. 47.5.pr,l is found in D.4.9.7pr, 0.47.5.2 in 0.4.9.7.1, 0.47.5.3 in 0.4.9.6.4,
0.47.5.5 in 0.4.9.7.4, and 0.47.5.6 in 0.4.9.6.3. 0.47.5.4 is the only portion of 47.5
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title refer to both damage and theft, but the Theft title covers only
theft. Filing fragments 6 and 7 in the Restoration title produces a direct
conflict within the same title. 4o Fragment 2 says "an innkeeper is liable
for the acts of travelers,"41 but paragraph 3 of fragment 6 states that
the innkeepers' liability for the behavior of those living in the inn does
not apply "to one who is received as a passing guest, such as a traveler. ''42
The repetitious nature and confusing placement of fragments 6 and
7 resulted from difficulties in classifying the action for damages, problems
created by the compilers' methodology, and a lapse in judgment or
concentration.
1. The Actio Damni A.N.C.S.

Although the strict liability of the actio de recepto covered damage
as well as loss, the double damages of the quasi-delictual actio furti
a.n.c.s. applied only to the theft of the goods of a customer. (Furtum
is Latin for theft.) The actio damni a.n.c.s. was the quasi-delictual action
when the defendant's employee damaged a customer's goods.
Lenel thought that there was an edict for the actio damni a.n.c.s.,
and that it followed immediately after the edict on the lex Aquilia
in Julian's Edict. 43 He pointed to book 18 of Ulpian's On the Edict,
which discussed the actio damni a.n.c.s. in connection with the lex Aqui/ia
and harm to another's personal property. Unlike Ulpian, however, the
Digest compilers chose not to discuss the actio damni a.n.c.s. in
connection with material dealing with the lex Aqui/ia and harm to
property, topics they dealt with in book 9 of the Digest. 44 They apparently
· thought the actio damni a.n.c.s. was more closely related to the other
praetorial actions against ships' masters, innkeepers and stablekeepers.
Huvelin contended that there was no separate edict for the actio
damni a.n.c.s. in Julian's time, because the Digest does not give it a
that deals with the receptum, pointing out that where the receptum lies, the nauta should
have the suit for furti against the thief. That point is also made in 0.4.9.4pr.
40. There may be enough of a transition so that the reader understands different
actions are meant. Paragraph I of fragment 6 begins with the example of the operator
of a ship or an inn who employs a slave owned by another. It poses the hypothetical
of damage or theft by the slave of his owner's goods. Although the action for theftfurtum-or an action for damages-damnum-would normally lie against the slave's
owner noxally, the operator is liable to the owner for the wrong done him by his own
slave because it is an action in factum. Perhaps the specific reference to theft and damage
is sufficient to indicate that the remaining discussion is addressing the actio furti a.n.c.s.
and not the receptum.
41. 0.4.9.2.
42. 0.4.9.6.3.
43. Lenel, supra note 9 at 205 [§78].
44. 0.9.1.1; 0.9.2.1,3,5,7,"9,11,13,15,17,21,23,25,27,29,35. See 0.9.4.2,6,14; 0.4.9.7;
0.47.10.25; 0.47.12.2; 0.48.8.10 which relate to such harms.
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separate title. 4 5 Huvelin argued that the actio damni a.n.c.s. was patterned
on the formula associated with the actiofurti a.n.c.s., noting that Ulpian
added references to theft when discussing the liability of the nauta for
damage to goods. 46 The close relationship of the actio damni a.n.c.s.
and the actio furti a.n.c.s. does not prove the actio damni was n.ot
a separate edict, for it is possible that the compilers simply believed
that amalgamating the discussion of the actio damni a.n.c.s. with other
actions in one title would help condense the material.
While Ulpian discussed the actio damni a.n.c.s. and the actio furti
a.n.c.s. together in book 18 on damages to personal property, he discussed
the actio furti a.n.c.s. alone in book 38 which dealt largely with edicts
involving theft. Ulpian's book 38 was a major source for Digest book
47, and the excerpts on the actio furti a.n.c.s. from that book of Ulpian
became the Theft title of the Digest.47 The problem is to explain why
the compilers chose to place the fragments from Ulpian's book 18 which
combined the discussion of the actio damni a.n.c.s. with the actio furti
a.n.c.s. in a title devoted to the actio de· recepto. That explanation
involves a short excursion into the method used in compiling the Digest.
2. The Methodology of the Compilers

Tribonian divided the compilers into three committees. On the basis
of the first works which each committee read and excerpted, the
committees have subsequently been called the Sabinian, edictal and
Papinian committees.48 Working with Alan Rodger, Professor Tony
Honore constructed a theory of the editorial process by which the
45. Huvelin, supra note 27 at 128.
46. Huvelin, supra note 27 at 127-35.
47. D.47.2.53,93; D.47.4.1; D.47.5; D.47.6.1,3; D.47.7.7. See D.l3.1.6,10,12;
D.39.4.12.
48. The theory of three subcommittees was proposed by F. B1uhme in "Die Ordnung
der Fragmente in den Pandektentite1n," 4 Zeitschrift fur geschichtliche Rechtswissenschaft
256-474 (1818), reprinted in 6 Labeo 50 (1960). He observed that excerpts from distinct
groups of classical writings tended to stand side by side within the individual Digest
titles. These groups or "masses" appeared in a regular sequence in the titles, although
the sequence began with different groups in different titles.
"It is as if the titles were hands of cards in which, so far as five cards out
of every six were concerned, the player, when he looked at his cards, found
that they were arranged in suits and, within each suit, in numerical order,
but that in some hands hearts came first, in others spades and so on. Bluhme
interpreted the 'suits' as masses and, within each suit, the numerical order
as the order in which the commissioners were to read the works assigned
to them."
·
Tony Honore, Tribonian (London: Gerald Duckworth & Co., 1978) p. 150. Bluhme's
theory is generally accepted. J olowicz, supra note 12 at 493; Kunkel, supra note 4 at
169-70; Leage, supra note 8 at 54; J.A.C. Thomas, Textbook of Roman Law (Amsterdam
and Oxford: North-Holland Publishing Company, 1976) p. 58.
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excerpts were compiled into the books of the Digest. He said that each
committee had two commissioners and a number of other personnel
(barristers) attached to it, and he even offered a theory to identify which
scholar was on which committee and what books each read. 49
Each scholar was assigned particular books to read and excerpt.
Honore postulated that at the initial stage of excerpting, the two
commissioners in each committee read and excerpted in groups of
material, dividing each group into equal lots between them. The junior
member handed his excerpts from each lot to the senior member who
would file and distribute them in titles. If the senior member received
them before completing work on his own lot, he might intersperse the
excerpts of the junior member with his own.so Honore suggests that
each excerpt was on a separate piece of papyrus and they were stacked
on top of one another, so the mass for a given title consisted of a
pile of fragments with the first text on the bottom and the last text
on the top as it was added.5 1 The excerpts from all the committees
on each title were stacked together, and all the titles in a book were
given to a committee to edit. Each committee edited about a third
of the books-Honore believed that the work was done in alternative
series, e.g. the Sabinian Committee edited books 1,4,7,10 etc.s2 When
this task was completed, the commission sat together to review the
entire work as a whole.sJ
The misflling of fragments 6 and 7 began in the initial excerpting
process when two committees flied material dealing with the same subject
matter under different titles. The books the Sabinian Committee read
and excerpted dealt with the actio furti a.n.c.s. and not with any other
actions against the nautae, caupones and stabularii. The Sabinian
Committee put the fragment on the actio furti a.n.c.s. in the Theft
title, D.47.5. 54 The Edictal Committee read and excerpted fragments
which dealt with a variety of actions against the nautae, caupones and

49. Honore, Tribonian, supra note 48 at 146-86. Honore's theory on subdividing
the readings was attacked in Douglas J. Osler, "The Compilation of Justinian's Digest,"
102 Zeitschriji der Savigny-Stiftung fur Rechtsgeschichte, Romanistche Abteilung 12984 ( 1985). His theory on the identity of the committee members was criticized in David
Pugsley, "Some Reflections on the Completion of Justinian's Digest," 19 Irish Jurist
350 (1984).
50. Honore, Tribonian, supra note 48 at 156.
51. /d. at 175-76.
52. /d. at 180.
53. /d. at 185-86.
54. If Honore is correct, Tribonian himself read and excerpted Ulpian, Edict books
28 and 38 as well as Gaius, Golden Words, book 3 which either are the source of the
double penalty discussion [Ulpian book 38 in D.47.5] or refer to liability for seamen's
wrongs as in the section on exercitores (Ulpian book 28 in D.l4.1.1] or comparison
to an item falling from an upper story [Gaius book 3 in D.44.7.5.6]. Honore, Tribonian,
supra note 48 at 258, 261.
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stabularii-the actio de recepto, the actio damni a.n.c.s. and the actio
furti a.n.c.s.-and it filed them all together in the Restoration title,
D.4.9. The Edictal Committee's decision to file all the references to
actions against the ships' masters, innkeepers and stablekeepers under
the same title followed from its methodology and the particular content
of the passages excerpted.
If Honore is correct, Theophilus, the senior member of the Edictal
Committee, excerpted the first five fragments of title 9 of book 4, the
passages dealing with the actio de recepto. They were excerpted from
three books which dealt generally with what this paper has called the
restitutionary recovery.ss
Several fragments on the actio de recepto which Theophilus
excerpted mentioned theft, but they were not concerned with the actio
furti a.n.c.s.s6 Shipwreck was an exception to liability under the actio
de recepto,s7 and theft was the likely explanation for goods lost aboard
ship in any other way. The person liable for safekeeping was liable
under the actio de recepto for stolen goods even if no one could identify
the thief. The last paragraph of fragment three discussed the relationship
between the praetorian action on the actio de recepto and the action
for theft.Ss As fragment four, Theophilus added a section from Paul
arguing that the nauta should be able to sue the perpetrator for theft
because the nauta bore the risk. Paul then stated that the risk included
55. Ulpian, Edict, book 14; Gaius, Provincial Edict, book 5; and Paul, Edict, book
13. It appears that these texts, like the Digest, followed the order of the Perpetual Edict
which treated matters referred to arbitration immediately before the actio de recepto.
Ulpian's book 13 dealt with the arbiter and enforcement of his decree, so discussion
of the receptum in book 14 follows that. Gaius book 5 dealt heavily with the arbiter
as did Paul book 13.
56. It has been suggested that D.4.9.4 and 5 deal with the Furtum and damnum
and not receptum. Huvelin, supra note 27 at 139. But Paul in fragment 4 refers to
the risk borne by the nauta who can then bring the actio furti against the thief, and
D. 47.5.1.4 makes clear that the nauta has this action if he has undertaken to restore
the goods-i.e. he is liable for receptum. Fragment 5 citing Gaius discusses liability for
safekeeping. Although it states that what is said of theft applies to property damage,
the fragment centers on persons who agree to receive something on the understanding
that it will be safe, a characteristic of the receptum. It seems likely that Gaius was discussing
what liability existed under the receptum after the exception taken by Labeo for acts
of God and piracy-it was for custodia just like persons who are paid for the safekeeping
of goods. That meant the nauta was liable if the goods were stolen or damaged. In
this sense, the passage is not referring to the actio furti for double damages, but simply
to the liability under the receptum if the goods are stolen. See Feenstra, "Deux textes
de Gaius sur Ia responsabilite contractuelle: D. 19.2.40 et D. 4.9.5," Droits de L'Antiquite
et Socio/ogie Juridique: Melanges Henri uvy-Bruh/ pp. 105, 116 (Paris: Sirey, 1959)
[Publications de l'Institut de Droit Romain de l'Universitt! de Paris, No. 27].
57. 0.4.9.3.1.
58. "Lastly, it must be seen whether both a praetorian action on account of goods
received and an action for theft can be brought in relation to the same matter. And
Pomponius is doubtful. But the better opinion is that either by application to the judge
or the defense of fraud, he ought to be restricted to one or other of them." D.4.9.3.5.
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liability for accompanying baggage for which no separate fee was paid.s9
An excerpt from Gaius followed as fragment five, noting that the fees
paid ships' masters, innkeepers or stablekeepers are not for safekeeping,
but the liability for custodia still exists. That liability is not only for
theft but also damage to the goods. The context of Gaius is a discussion
of the obligation of safekeeping, so the reference to theft in this passage
is not a reference to the legal action for theft (actio furtr) but to the
stealing itself. 60
The junior member of the Edictal Committee excerpted the other
passages in 4.9 from Paul, Edict, book 22 and Ulpian, Edict, book
18. Those books dealt with the lex Aquilia. They discussed damages
caused by slaves and quite naturally included a discussion of the action
against nautae, caupones and stabularii for damaging property-the
actio damni a.n.c.s. The junior committee member marked all the sections
in these books of Paul and Ulpian that touched on the nautae and
caupones and submitted them together to the senior member.
If we assume that the Digest rubrics were tentatively agreed upon
before the reading commenced, the senior member had no separate
title under which to file material dealing with the actio damni a.n.c.s.
Theophilus could place the excerpts of his junior -either in the title
on actio de recepto which he was then working on or in the title on
the actio furti a.n.c.s. whose contents he had not yet seen. The excerpts
contained material on the furtum a.n.c.s. as well as the damnum a.n.c.s.,
but they did not come from a book on the furtum a.n.c.s.
The excerpts from Paul dealt inter alia with two issues Theophilus
had just excerpted from the actio de recepto-whether recovery for
stolen or damaged property was available when no fee was paid for
safekeeping and what was the relationship of the action against the
thief to the actions against the na'!tae.6 1 This led the senior member
59. "PAUL, Edict, book 13: Again, the action for theft is available to the "seaman"
himself since he bears the risk, unless he should himself steal and afterward the property
is stolen from him, or, in the case where another has stolen, the "seaman" himself is
not solvent. I. If a seaman receives the property of a seaman, a stablekeeper that of
a stablekeeper and an innkeeper that of an innkeeper, he will still be liable. 2. Vivianus
said that this edict also related to things which are brought in after the merchandise
has been placed on board and the contract of carriage made, although no freight for
them is due, such as clothing and daily provisions, because these things are themselves
accessories to the contract for the carriage of the other things." 0.4.9.4.
60. "GAlUS, Provincial Edict, book 5: The seaman, innkeeper, and stablekeeper.
receive a reward not on account of the safekeeping of the goods, but the seaman so
that he may transport passengers, the innkeeper that he permit travelers to stay in the
inn, the stablekeeper that he allow beasts to be stabled with him; and yet they are liable
on account of safekeeping. For the fuller and tailor receive a fee not on account of
safekeeping, but for the exercise of their skill; and yet they are liable under the action
for lettmg on account of safekeeping. I. Whatever we have said about theft ought also
to be understood about damage to property. For there ought to be no doubt that one
who agrees to receive something on the understanding that it will be safe is held to
undertake to keep it not only from being stolen but also from being damaged." 0.4.9.5.
61. It included a discussion of the peculiar position of the slave hired out to a
ship's master who stole or damaged his owner's property or who was injured by another,
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to put the passage from Paul, Edict book 22 together with his own
excerpts on the actio de recepto. He knew that the passages on liability
for travelers were not inconsistent because they referred to different
types of liability, having drawn them from different locations, but
there was no transitional defining phrase to point this out. The passage
from Ulpian's book 18 was added as 0.4.9.7 because it elaborated
on issues discussed in 4.9.6. It is also possible that the provisions
on waiver from D.4.9.7pr were understood to apply to the actio de
recepto and that encouraged placement of the whole section in the
actio de recepto.
The explanation that each subcommittee placed only the excerpts
they read in a single title is not complete, however. All the commissioners
would have known that two separate edicts existed-and the Sabinian
Committee read and excerpted several paragraphs on the nauta's ability
to sue the thief because the nauta was liable under the actio de recepto.62
Honore believed the Sabinian Committee under Tribonian was
responsible for editing the excerpts in book 4 while the Edictal Committee
under Theophilus was responsible for editing book 47. If that is correct,
the repetition and the inconsistencies should have troubled them.
Although there are some explanations for their failure to move the
excerpts from Paul, book 22, and Ulpian, Edict, book 18 into Digest
book 47, ultimately the decision must be viewed as a mistake.
3. The Lapse in Judgment
One explanation is that the editors thought the actio damni a.n.c.s.
more closely related to the actio de recepto than to the actiofurti a.n.c.s.
The promise of safekeeping implied in the actio de recepto included
safety from all harm, whether loss or damage.6J Thus, the Restoration
title, 0.4.9, appropriately analyzes damage as just one type of loss
a discussion that might be relevant to either receptum or furtum. Only the innkeeper
reference seems out of place.
62. 0.47.2.14.17; 0.47.5.1.4.
63. 0.4.9.3.1; 0.4.9.5.1. Another possible explanation for the placement would be
that the actio furti a.n.c.s. was for double damages but the actio damni a.n.c.s. was
for single damages like the actio de recepto. The person who damaged the goods would
be liable to an action on the lex Aquilia, which was for single damages only unless
the defendant denied liability. It would be extraordinary for the vicarious liability under
the actio damni a.n.c.s. to exceed the liability of the perpetrator.'
But 0.4.9.1.1 says this actio in factum lies for double. The previous passage discusses
an action for damnum. Citing this portion of the Digest, both Lenel and Huvelin agree
that the actio damni a.n.c.s. is for double damages. Lenel, supra note 9 at 205. Huvelin,
supra note 27 at 129. Although it might be argued that the texf refers to the actio
furti a.n.c.s. or to double damages for denying liability, it is a powerful support for
Huvelin's description of the evolution of the actio damni a.n.c.s. if it was for double
damages. They would make sense only as a wholesale transfer of the formula for the
actio furti a.n.c.s. to the actio damni a.n.c.s.
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whereas an action for theft of goods is distinct from an action for
damages to goods.
Further, the editors may have believed that the prefatory words
of each of the excerpted fragments also applied to the actio de recepto
even though they were originally stated with respect to the actio damni
a.n.c.s. and the actio furti a.n.c.s. Fragment 6 begins with the issue
of liability for the goods of the person who has obtained lodging
or passage gratuitously. It follows logically from the discussion in
fragment 5 on the absence of separate payment for the luggage of
travelers and passengers, and demonstrates that liability is not affected
by whether the services are free or must be paid for. Fragment 6
continues with a hypothetical involving one person's slave who is
employed by another on a ship or inn. The liability of the employer
to the owner may have been the same for both the actio de recepto
and the actio furti a.n.c.s.64
Fragment 7 begins with references to the liability of ships' masters
for the acts of their sailors, but then turns to the potential waiver by
passengers of their rights against ships' masters. Waiver does not seem
appropriate for the actio furti a.n.c.s. since it is based on the praetor's
edict and the alleged fault of ships' masters in selection of the crew
and not on the contract. 65 If it were applied to the actio de recepto,
however, it would make sense and buttress the argument that strict
liability under the actio de recepto was contractual.66 Further, there
is some joint application to the subsequent discussion of the liability
of ships' masters for damage to the crew,67
64. The employer is liable to the owner for loss of goods, even if the owner's slave
stole them. 0.4.9.6.1. The employer may not be liable to the owner if the slave was
injured by someone else who can be held liable independently. 0.4.9.6.2. This could
apply to the actio de recepto if the slave as employee is not considered property accepted
for safekeeping. 0.4.9.6.3 discusses the liability of the innkeeper for the actio furti a.n.c.s.,
but the limitation on the victim to either a suit against the perpetrator or against the
operator in 0.4.9.6.4 applies to the actio de recepto as well. 0.4.9.3.1.
65. 0.44.7.5.6. Note that the liability waiver only occurs if it is waived by a passenger
who would be capable of watching the property. It does not apply to shipments of
goods unaccompanied by owners or their representatives. Given the harshness of imposing
double damages in a case of vicarious liability, it is not unreasonable to permit a waiver
despite its exceptional nature.
66. The sentence on waiver was probably an interpolation. It states that if there
is a waiver, the ship's master is not sued, i.e. there is no action. Thus, the following
sentence, which begins "This action," refers to an action previously discussed and the
sentence on waiver of liability appears to interrupt the natural grammatical progression.
Waiver is an example of a situation for which the ship's master bears no liability, so
the comment does relate to the prior statement that the ship's master bears no liability
for the behavior of sailors off the ship. That explains its insertion, but it could have
been wrenched from a different context where it referred ·originally to the actio de recepto.
67. The ship's master is unlikely to have guaranteed safekeeping to the crew member
unless the individual is also shipping goods or working his passage. Thus, to whom
a ship's master is liable may be alike for the actio de recepto and the actio furti a.n.c.s.
0.4.9.7.2.
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These explanations for the placement of fragments 6 and 7 in the
Restoration title are plausible, but the close relationship between the
actio damni a.n.c.s. and the actio furti a.n.c.s. should have prevailed
as an organizing principle. The references to the actio damni a.n.c.s.
in the fragments are intertwined with references to the actio furti a.n.c.s.
and therefore should have been placed in the title dealing with that
action. Unlike the actio de recepto, the actio damni a.n.c.s. and the
actio furti a.n.c.s. apply only when the loss or injury is inflicted by
the operator or his employees. Although both the actio de recepto and
the actio damni a.n.c.s. lie for damage to goods, they are otherwise
quite distinct. In short, the commissioners made a mistake.
Despite the inappropriate placement of the fragments, the evidence
is strong that there were at least two separate actions with different
characteristics that coexisted in Justinian's era to respond to problems
of theft, damage and loss in inns, stables and aboard ships-the vicarious
liability of the actio furti a.n.c.s. with its double damages and the strict
liability of the actio de recepto.
IV. The Origin and Development of the
Explanations for the Actions
The inconsistencies in the scope of liability and the measure of
damages are easily resolved by the conclusion that there were two
separate actions against nautae, caupones et stabularii. The explanation
for the inadequacy of the Digest's justifications for those actions is
more controversial. The statement in the innkeeper's duty paragraph
that innkeepers chose long term residents but cannot refuse persons
making a journey is probably a post-classical interpolation impelled
by the desire to attribute fault. The contradiction in the operator's choice
paragraph which states that nautae, innkeepers, and stablekeepers can
choose whether to receive anyone is a phrase that lost its original meaning
when the underlying law changed. An examination of the history of
the actio furti a.n.c.s. and the actio de recepto reveals the real reasons
behind their separate development and how the mistaken reasons became
part of the Digest.
A. The Obligation to Take Travelers-The Evolution ofthe Explanation
for the Double Penalty of the Actio Furti A.N.C.S.
The actio furti a.n.c.s. grew out of the actio furti (or action of
theft). In the first century B.C. Servius Sulpicius Rufus responded to
a case in which several persons had poured their grain together in a
ship. The ship's master returned the grain to one of them and later
the ship foundered and the rest of the grain was lost. Servius said
that if the grain had been separately enclosed so as to belong to
identifiable individuals separately, interchange would not be permitted
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and the owners of the grain could sue the ship's master for theft. 68
The inappropriate mixing and misdelivery of the grain would probably
be done by the crew at the behest of the captain, acting within the
scope of his authority. Actio Furti for this behavior may have been
the first step in making the operator of the ship liable for any theft
committed by the crew.
The Digest justifies the actio furti a.n. c.s. by the fault of the master
in "using the services of bad men ''69 or because he "himself has made
use of their services at his risk'770 and liability is "in respect of fault
for employing such persons.'771 But making a bad choice of employees
does not create double liability on employers in other businesses for
thefts by their employees. Thus, the fault or culpa notion seems an
afterthought rather than the original reason for the action.
Huvelin contended that the actiofurti a.n.c.s. was the natural result
of merchants bringing the actio furti where the goods they loaded on
ship were not delivered. If nothing had happened to the vessel, the
explanation must be theft. Although the thiers identity might not be
known, it was likely to be a member of the crew. Huvelin thought
the praetor may have decided the operator of the business should be
liable anyway.72 But the Digest provisions on the actio furti a.n.c.s.
allow recovery only where the plaintiff proves that the theft was
committed by a member of the crew.73
In extending the actio furti to liability of the nautae and others,
the praetor was probably influenced by the likelihood of collusion
between the employee and the employer. 74 Fear of collusion was an
68. 0.19.2.31.
69. 0.44.7.5.6.
70. 0.4.9.7pr.
71. 0.4.9.7.4.
72. Huvelin, supra note 27 at 120.
73. 0.47.5.1.pr,6.
74. Sargenti suggests the extension of the furtum was connected to the principle
behind noxal liability. Manlio Sargenti, "Osservazioni sulla responsabilita dell'exercitor
navis in diretto romano," Studi in memoria di Emilio Albertario, I (Milano: Giuffre,
1953) pp. 553, 579-80.
A property owner could not recover damages for theft from a slave because all
goods obtained by a slave belong to the slave's master. "Slaves are in the power of
their owners." Gaius, supra note 5 at 45 [1:52]. A slave also might be permitted by
the master to have a "peculium" for his own use which would be subject to suit. However,
the owner could sue the slave's master. Under the ancient principle of "noxal liability,"
the master had the choice of paying the amount owed by the slave or of turning the
slave over to the injured party. "Noxal actions lie when sons in power and slaves commit
a delict, for instance, theft or contempt. These actions allow the father or owner either
to pay the damages as assessed in money, or to make noxal surrender.... Some noxal
actions were established by statute, some by the Edict of the Praetor. Statutory instances
are the action of theft under the Twelve Tables lind for wrongful loss under the Aquilian
Act." /d. at 463-64 [11:75-76]. See also l..eage, supra note 8 at 69. This rule of "noxal
liability" also applied to harm done by animals.
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explanation offered for the actio de recepto.1s Collusion with employees
was a greater problem in inns and stables, but it may have applied
to ships as well. 76 The possibility of collusion also existed for the long
term lodger, whereas the casual relationship formed for the purpose
of a single night's rest or passage on the boat would not be as likely
to offer opportunities for conspiring against the other customers.
Although fear of collusion underlay both the actio furti a.n.c.s.
and the strict liability of the actio de recepto, that concern alone could
not explain the existence of two actions or the penalty in the actio
furti a.n.c.s .. The true explanation lay in the different paths by which
the actions developed: the actio furti a.n.c.s. evolved out of the penal
actio furti while the actio de recepto came from an express promise.
But historical explanations for doctrine were not appealing to Roman
jurists, who were concerned only with current doctrine.77
The classical jurists usually expounded on rules without giving the
reasons behind them, but post-classical writers influenced by the Greeks
In republican Rome, this principle of noxal liability applied to the members of
the family as well because all wealth was controlled by the paterfamilias. The paterfamilias
could either pay compensation for wrongs done by family members, or surrender the
offending member to the control of the injured person. In practice, of course, noxal
surrender of family members would be unusual, and the paterfamilias would most likely
pay the family debt. The noxal surrender of women swiftly disappeared on moral grounds.
Noxal surrender of sons vanished more slowly, probably in line with the growth of
sons' rights to some independent means "peculium." The extent of the "peculium" was
greatly enlarged for soldiers during the many periods of warfare of the principate and
the empire. Thus noxal liability for sons had essentially disappeared by the time of Justinian.
Leage, supra at 423-26. This basis for liability did not apply to free employees who
were personally responsible for their own wrongdoing. Nevertheless, it laid the foundation
for finding persons liable for the wrongs done by members of their household.
The employee of an innkeeper, stablekeeper or ship's master may have stayed on
the premises where people and animals remained over the evenings. In this sense they
were closer to members of the operator's household than in other businesses. Further,
the long term lodger became identified with the household of the innkeeper because
the innkeeper could exclude him. The overnight sojourner had no such identification
because he was only a very temporary resident. With respect to these peculiar households,
the traveler was at a special risk because he or she did not know the character of the
operator or his employees.
The growth of the peculium led to the end of noxal liability for family members.
Only noxal liability for slaves remained. By Justinian's .era, an explanation which
distinguished liability between lodgers and travelers in terms of membership in the
household no longer seemed relevant because the paterfamilias was not liable for household
members.
75. 0.4.9.1.1 and 0.4.9.3.1. The explanation is usually considered an interpolation.
76. Innkeepers generally had a bad reputation. See Kleberg, supra note 19 at 6,
27-28, 74-97; Firebaugh, supra note 19 at 124, 135, 245. See also G. Hermansen, "Roman
Inns and the Law: The Inns of Ostia," in Polis and Imperium: Studies in Honour of
Edward Togo Salmon (J.A.S. Evans, ed.; Toronto: Hakkert, 1974) pp. 167-70.
77. Gaius is exceptional in discussing the evolution of Roman law. See Fritz Schulz,
Principles of Roman Law (trans. Marguerite Wolff; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1936)
pp. 99, 102~5.
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began to offer reasons for legal rules, interpolating them in the classical
texts.78 They wanted an explanation to justify the law now, and an
accident of history would not do. To justify infliction of a penalty,
ordinarily the defendant must be at fault. Here there was no fault,
unless it was the master's bad judgment in choosing the employee. That
then became the justification offered. But fault in choice-culpa in
e/igendo-:-does not work as well for the distinction between lodger and
traveler unless it can be said that the lodger is "chosen" in a manner
different from the traveler. And indeed that is exactly what the Digest
says in the innkeeper's duty paragraph. Thus, a distinction founded
in a prophylactic policy to prevent collusion in theft led to a post hoc
rationalization of fault which required a difference between lodgers and
travelers in terms of the innkeeper's ability to choose whether to accept
them.

B. The Power to Choose Customers-The Evolution of the Justification
for the Actio de Recepto
The reference to the power to choose customers in the operator's
choice paragraph originated in a different context where the language
served as effective justification for strict liability. The Latin phrase
initially referred to the operator's decision to expressly promise to keep
the goods of passengers or guests safe. Enforcing such an obligation
was not too harsh, for the promisors voluntarily undertook it. Gradually,
such a promise came to be implied in the contract for carriage or lodging,
and it could not be avoided unless the innkeeper or ship's master expressly
disclaimed it. The shift in the burden of expression was not perceived
to alter the suit and did not affect the justification. When Justinian's
compilers came to abridge the writings on the actio de recepto, they
found the reference to choice with respect to making a promise; but
now that the promise was implicit, the same words meant choice with
respect to accepting the customer. Since ships' masters had such a choice,
the compilers left the explanatory passage intact although its meaning
had changed.
1. Original express promise in shipping contract to be responsible for

loss or damage
The origin of the actio de recepto was an express guarantee by
the person managing the boat to keep the goods safe. 79 The origin
78. /d. at 98-100.
79. There is general agreement that the actio furti a.n.c.s. preceded the receptum.
Sargenti, supra note 74 at 553-80; J.C. Van Oven, "Actio Recepto et Actio Locati,"
24 Tijdschrift voor Rechtsgeschiedenis 137. Cf. Francisco De Robertis, Receptum
Nautarum (1952). If strict liability existed pursuant to the actio de recepto, there would
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is reflected in the edict which provides for an action against the nauta,
caupones et stabularii "in respect of what they have received and
undertaken to keep safe. ''80 The language suggests an expresss
undertaking to keep the goods safe.
Further, in discussing the option of the owner of stolen property
to sue either the thief in a civil action or the operator of the ship,
stable or inn in a praetorian action, Ulpian adds, "But if the innkeeper
or the ship's master has guaranteed the safety of the goods, it is he
and not the owner of the stolen thing who will have the civil action
of theft because, by his guarantee, he incurs the risk of safekeeping,''8I
The passage suggests that the assurance of safekeeping must be express,
because it departs from the norm stated in the prior sentence in which
the owner of the goods would have the action for theft.s2 The express
nature of the promise to keep goods safe is also supported by the evidence
from papyrus records of shipping transactions in Egypt. They reveal
during the Roman era of Egypt that shippers made an express promise
to keep the goods safe. sJ
have been no need for the actio furti a.n.c.s., which provides liability in more limited
circumstances. Absolute liability should be a sufficient deterrent to negligence or
misconduct by the nautae or caupones without any additional spur of double damages.
If the actio furti a.n.c.s. came first, however, there would have been a need to create
a more extensive civil action (receptum) to cover situations where the actio furti a.n.c.s.
failed to apply. On the other hand, it might be argued that the express guarantee of
the safety of goods came first; then an action (actio furti a.n.c.s.) that was available
in the absence of the express statement; and finally a liability which collapsed the express
guarantee and the general norm in receptum.
80. 0.4.9.lpr. The person who lost goods in an inn or aboard a ship could also
sue under the civil law for negligence in the leasing or hiring or for fraud by a bailee
in deposit.
81. 0.47.5.1.4.
82. If the holder paid the owner for the loss, the owner had to cede his actions
against the wrongdoer to the holder. For example, "If a fuller or a clothes-mender loses
clothing and then gives satisfaction to the [clothing's] owner on this score, the owner
must cede the vindicatio and the condictio for it." 0.19.2.25.8. If the property was stolen
from a holder who was liable to the owner for custodia, which includes liability in the
case of third party theft, the holder could maintain the action in furtum. The owner
then was barred unless the holder was insolvent. Thus, the holder could obtain multiple
damages while the owner could get from him only the value of the thing stolen. There
was, however, only a remote possibility that the holder would actually profit from this
rule, because of the uncertainty of catching the thief and the probability that, if caught,
the thief would not even be able to pay the value of the stolen goods. Leage, supra
note 8 at 398-407. At the same time, ships' masters might worry that a thieving crew
member would leave town if the legal process was long delayed. Thus, ships' masters
might have been influenced to make promises of strict liability in order to be able to
bring the actio furti against their crew members immediately, rather than waiting until
they lost a suit under the actio furti a.n.c.s. before being able to obtain a right to sue
the thief.
83. "The meaning of the clause is that nauta takes the responsibility for every casus
including vis maior." Raphael Taubenschlag, The Law of Greco-Roman Egypt in the
light of the Papyri: 332 B.C.-640 A.D. (New York: Herald Square Press, 1944, p. 288).

HeinOnline -- 36 Am. J. Legal Hist. 348 1992

1992

LIABILITY UNDER ROMAN LAW

349

The shipping arrangements might not be made in person, and that
might make it difficult to enter into an enforceable stipulatio. 84 Under
the agreement of hire, locati-conducti, ships' masters were liable for
loss caused by their fault.ss If the whole ship was hired, the merchant
could bring an action for his lost goods on the hire, ex conducto. If
the nauta was hired to transport the goods, the merchant could sue
on the act of letting, ex locato.B6 When it was unclear whether the
owner of goods "hired the ship or leased out the transporting of the
cargo" as a job, the praetor would give an actio infactum. 81 But these
actions were based on fault. Liability without fault required a promise
of safekeeping. If that promise was in additK>n to the agreement of
carriage, it might not have fit the previously existing categories of
enforceable promises. That would be sufficient to lead the praetor to
announce in an edict that such promises were enforceable.
2. Original explanation refers to discretion to promise
The operator's choice paragraph states that strict liability on the
nauta and others was not too harsh because "nam est in ipsorum arbitrio,
ne quem recipiant" (emphasis supplied), which has been translated as
"it is in their own discretion whether to receive anyone." But "recipere"
is ambiguous. It may refer to making a promise or taking responsibility
rather than simply receiving the person or the goods. 88 If given the
meaning of "promise," the statement is an excellent rebuttal to criticism
that strict liability is too harsh. If ships' masters were not willing to
undertake liability for loss that they did not cause, they did not have
to. "It is in their own discretion whether to promise anyone." That
is probably the original meaning of the phrase.
3. Express promise becomes naturale negotii an implied term of the
agreement by the agreement by the time of Justinian if not before
There is some controversy over whether innkeepers or nautae were
liable only if they expressly promised to keep the goods safe or whether
the promise was implicit.B9 Most commentators agree that the
84. Stipulatio was a formal method of creating a unilateral obligation by means
of an oral question, setting out the terms of the obligation, and an immediate oral
answer acceding to those terms.
85. 0.19.2.13.1,2; D.4.9.3.1.
86. D.4.9.3.1.
87. D.l9.5.1.
88. Huvelin, supra note 27 at 137; J.B.C. Stephen, "The Water-Carrier and His
Responsibility," The Law Quarterly Review 46:116, 119 (1896); Van Oven, "Actio de
Recepto," supra note 79 at 137, 149.
89. Crook, supra note 27 at 226.
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edict as stated in the Digest imposed an agreement to keep goods
safe in the absence of any disclaimer.9o
First, the ship's master is said to accept goods and undertake that
they will be safe "even if they have not been handed over.... [H]e
receives for safekeeping all the goods which have been brought onto
the ship. ''91 Although this passage could be read as a guide to interpreting
the extent of an express. undertaking, the statement seems more likely
to assume that allowing goods on board involves such an undertaking
without an express statement.
Second, the Digest says liability for loss extends to goods which
were not even mentioned in the contract:
this edict also related to things which are brought in after the merchandise
has been placed on board and the contract of carriage made, although no
freight for them is due, such as clothing and daily provisions, because these
things are themselves accessories to the contract for the carriage of the other
things.92

An express undertaking to keep them safe would be unlikely.
Third, liability does not depend on an exchange of value for an
undertaking to keep goods safe.
The seaman, innkeeper, and stablekeeper receive a reward not on account
of the safekeeping of the goods, but the seaman so that he may transport
passengers, the innkeeper that he permit travelers to stay in the inn, the
stablekeeper that he allow beasts to be stabled with him; and yet they are
liable on account of safekeeping. 93

This suggests that the liability extends to all goods with no specific
transaction or promise to keep them safely.
90. Leage says the undertaking was implied upon the promisee's entry, but the
relationship between the liability on the undertaking and the liability for tort was
uncertain. Leage, supra note 8 at 381,422. Mackeldey says the ship's master or innkeeper
who receives the things of a traveler in his ship or inn contracts a strict obligation,
and may be sued in an action in factum de recepto. Mackeldey, supra note 27 at 361.
"Receptum nautae, cauponis, stabularii was an undertaking required by the edict of
ships' masters, innkeepers and livery stable-owners that their clients' goods would be
safe (res salvas fore) while on their vessel or premises." The Institutes of Justinian
(trans. J.A.C. Thomas; Amsterdam and Oxford: North-Holland Publishing Company,
1975) p. 249, 280-82. See also Max Radin, Handbook of Roman Law (St. Paul: West
Publishing Co., 1927) p. 254-55. Leon-Robert Mt!nager, "'Naulum' et Receptum Rem
Salvum Fore' Contribution a L'Etude de Ia Responsabilitt! Contractuelle dans les
"I;ransports Maritimes, en Droit Romain," Revue Historique Du Droit Fran_fais et
Etranger 37:177-213; 385-411 (1960).
91. 0.4.9.1.8.
92. 0.4.9.4.2. This statement of Vivianus quoted by Paul is also found in a slightly
different form in a fragment of Ulpian. 0.4.9.1.6. J.A. Crook said that the actio de recepto
and the actio furti a.n.c.s. applied only to baggage and not to the carriage of freight in
general. Crook, supra note 27 at 226. But the quotes from Vivianus indicate that the actio
de recepto applied to merchandise as well as baggage. Further, other passages on the actio
de recepto specify liability for all (omnium) goods (0.4.9.1.8), and discuss merchandise that
had been pledged as security (0.4.9.1.7) and is therefore unlikely to be simply baggage.
93. D.4.9.5pr.
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Fourth, the passage continues: "For the fuller and tailor receive
a fee not on account of safekeeping, but for the exercise of their skill;
and yet they are liable under the action for letting on account of
safekeeping." A fuller is a person who cleans and thickens cloth. The
liability of a fuller under the contract includes liability for theft by
third parties.94 The analogy to the fuller and the tailor are to occupations
where liability is not based on an express undertaking, but on an implied
understanding arising out of the job.95 Thus, the analogy suggests that
the ship's master, innkeeper or stablekeeper were likewise liable without
an express promtse.
Fifth, the rationale offered for liability is not that it accords with
the promise of the ship's master or the innkeeper, but that it is an
important protection against collusion with thieves. This policy makes
more sense applied to all transactions rather than just those where a
special promise has been made.
Sixth, the provision that the person in charge of the ship will not
be sued if the passengers accept his declaration that he is not liable
indicates that liability was implicit unless expressly repudiated.96 The
disclaimer might be an effective warning to customers that it was risky
to deal with that operator.
Finally, evidence that the actio de recepto had become an implicit
term of the contract of transport rather than needing an express
agreement is found in the papyri. The express clauses of the third and
94. "A fuller lost your clothing; there is a third party from whom you may
claim them, but you do not choose to reclaim them. Despite this you sue
the fuller on the lease. But [Labeo thinks that] the judge would determine
whether you can better proceed against the thief and obtain your property
from him, at the fuller's expense, of course; but if he observes that this is
impossible for you, then he will make the fuller pay you but will force you
to provide him with your actions." 0.19.2.60.2.
J.A.C. Thomas, "Furtum and Locatio Conductio," II Irish Jurist (New Series) 170
(1976) attacked this passage as a corruption. He argued that liability of the fuller is
independent of the discovery of the wrongdoer and that no official would deprive an
individual of an action under these circumstances.
The fuller's liability is a civil action on the agreement-locatio operis. Although
there was a similar action against the nauta, it did not include liability for theft by
underlings. Thus, Pomponius expressed surprise at the existence of the praetorian action
against the innkeeper or ship's master, but noted that liability in hire was for fault while
the action against the innkeeper or ship's master lay without regard to fault. 0.4.9.3.1.
95. "If Ude's theory could be accepted, according to which 'recipere' only means
to take over responsibility and the 'salvum fore recipere' of the edict indicates nothing
but a praetorian pact, difficulties would vanish. But 'recipere' here signifies to receive
the person rather than the higher liability in respect of him or his property." Stephen,
supra note 88 at 136.
96. D.4.9.7pr. It may be argued, however, that this waiver applies only to waiver
of the liability under the actio furti where double damages lie for the behavior of the
crew of a ship or the staff of an inn.
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fourth centuries are no longer found in the shipping documents of the
ftfth and sixth centuries.97
The movement from express to implicit undertaking was eased
by a reduction in t~e liability of the ships' masters. Labeo is said to
have made an exception in the actio de recepto for shipwreck and piracy.
But that left the ships~ masters liable for something very close to custodia,
which was the liability of bailees for hire. While it would be harsh
to impose liability on ships' masters for force majeure without an express
agreement, it was not unreasonable to imply an agreement to incur
the common lesser obligation.
4. Explanation now refers to ability to reject passengers and freight

To recapitulate: early texts said that the strict liability of the actio
de recepto was not too harsh because it did not lie unless the ship's
master decided to promise expressly to keep goods safely (ne quem
recipiant). Over time, this guarantee of safekeeping became an implicit
element of the shipping contract. It attached whenever the goods were
received on board. The new legal context affected the interpretation
of the inherently ambiguous "recipere." It changed its meaning from
"taking responsibility for" in classical times to "receiving" in Justinian's
era.9s Thus, the translation of ne quem recipiant in the operator's choice
paragraph as "whether to receive anyone" is correct. Ships' masters
did have the power to refuse to carry goods or persons, so it was a
true statement of law,99 but it no longer made much sense as an
explanation.
The evolution from express promise to implicit term left its traces
in Digest passages which distinguished between ships' masters that had
undertaken to keep the goods safely and those who had not. After
the undertaking became implicit, the ships' masters could expressly
repudiate it. It was still important to discuss the effect of choosing
97. Taubenschlag, supra note 83 at 287-89.
98. "In classic law, the receptum was the declaration of the clear and explict will
of the captain of the boat, that he had received the goods and that he was agreeing
to deliver them sa/vas, however in the law of Justinian recipere signified simply accepting
the goods in the boat (illatio in navem), or even at dockside (in litore), without an
express clause of guaranty. That was a consequence of a new juridical regime, i.e. of
the changed notion of receptum which becomes a naturale negotii. This change manifested
itself even in the rubrica of the title D.4.9, for instead of the edict's expression on the
receptum, i.e. "quod cuisque salvumfore receperint," one reads there "nautae, caupones,
stabularii ut recepta restituant." Thus the words salvum fore have disappeared." J.C.
Van Oven, Book Review of De Robertis, Receptum nautarum, 2 Revue lnternationale
des Droits de /'Antiquit~ (3d Series) 423, 427 (1956) [translated from the French].
99. The Digest offers other passages that support the ship's master's ability to choose
whether to take passengers. For example, the owner is not liable if the captain violates
instructions and takes on passengers when hired only to take goods. D.l4.1.1.12. There
are no similar passages about innkeepers.
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whether to be bound by an undertaking to restore goods. The early
texts treated the absence of a promise as the standard. Although they
would have been phrased differently if written after the development
of an implicit obligation, the early texts continued to be accurate
statements. Thus, they were not altered by the compilers.
5. The hypothesis of a separate edict governing the actions against the
Innkeeper and Stablekeeper
The praetor may have issued separate edicts for nautae and for
caupones which were consolidated.IOO The theory that there were
originally separate edicts is supported by the language of the Digest.
Sentences that begin with references to those who operate ships, inns
or livery stables conclude with reference only to the ship. 101 This suggests
that the initial references to inns and livery stables were added to a
statement on the liability of ships' masters.1o2
These arguments suggest that the language of choice in D.4.9.lpr,
the operator's choice paragraph, originally applied only to ships'
masters.IOJ But Justinian's scholars surely knew that adding "innkeepers
and stablekeepers" to create a single edict in the first sentence of the
chapter made the language of choice refer also to innkeepers. Indeed,
scholars who propose the separate edict theory have argued that the
100. J.A.C. Thomas, "Carriage by Sea," 6 Revue lnternationale de Droit de
I'Antiquite (3d Series) 489 (1960). Van Oven argued that ships' masters were largely
under a different juridical regime than innkeepers. The ship's master contracted for his
carrier to be an active agent with respect to passengers and goods. He carried them
from one place to another; so masters were conduct ores operis faciendi. The inn and
the stable merely leased space to the customer and were locatio re, not locatio operis.
Van Oven, Review, supra note 98 at 425. But Van Oven has overstated the case. Thomas
noted that sometimes the sea carriage was also merely a lease of space and also /ocatores
rerum. Thomas, "Carriage by Sea," supra at 496. Further, there is some question whether
lodging and stabling were considered purely as leased space, especially since connected
services such as feeding the horse were likely to be involved.
101. D.47.5.1.pr; D.47.5.1.2.
102. Wherever a principle of general application is stated in D. 47.5, the specific
example always refers to shipping. The innkeeper is specifically discussed only at D.
47.5.6 where the liability rules differentiate between lodgers and overnight guests, a
consideration inapplicable to ships' masters. Indeed, the reason given for imposing liability
on the innkeeper for lodgers, i.e. that the innkeeper selects his permanent residents, applies
to the ship's master who may choose his passengers; nevertheless, the ship's master is
not liable under this chapter for the behavior of passengers. The impression created
is that one author wrote on the edict for ships' masters, and someone else later added
comments on innkeeper liability from another edict because the edicts shared a common
trait of imposing vicarious liability.
103. If "innkeepers and stablekeepers" were inserted next to "ships' masters" in
commentary that originally dealt with ships' masters, a phrase relating solely to ships'
masters could erroneously be made to apply to both. Thus, one explanation for the
apparent conflict in the passages on the duty to serve is that the ability to choose whom
to serve described in D.4.9.1.1 referred only to the ships' master.

HeinOnline -- 36 Am. J. Legal Hist. 353 1992

354

THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL HISTORY

Vol. XXXVI

operator's choice paragraph consists of sections taken from commentary
on the edict on nautae combined with a section taken from commentary
on caupones et stabularii.t04 Thus, even if the theory of separate origins
is true, the compilers intended that commentary applicable to one
business be understood to refer to the others as well. 105 Tribonian and
his coworkers could see that the text stated that innkeepers had a choice
whether to serve customers-and it is hard to understand why they
would let it stand if they knew it to be false.
V. The Obligation to Accept Customers
Thus far, this article has explained the apparent conflict in the
liability of ships' masters, innkeepers and stablekeepers for losses of
their customers' property and the reasons for the weakness of the
explanations offered. But that does not resolve the question whether
there was an obligation in Justinian's era for innkeepers to serve the
public.
A. Theories to Reconcile Digest Language With a Duty to Serve
A number of theories have been offered to show that the language
in the Digest on the obligation to serve the public is not contradictory.
Several theories insist that there was a duty to serve the public.
1. "Recipere" Means Promise

The prior discussion demonstrated that the text of the operator's
choice paragraph could be read to say only that the operators of the
specified businesses had discretion whether to promise to keep the goods
safe. That reading eliminates any direct statement that innkeepers could
decide whether to accept persons, and therefore it would be consistent
with the proposition that the innkeepers had a duty to accept travelers.
This theory has several flaws. First, the promise to keep goods
safe was implied and had to be specifically repudiated. Although the
operator of the business could avoid being held for a promise, it is
awkward to describe this as a choice of whether to make a promise
104. Van Oven, Review, supra note 98 at 425.
105. Under the theory of separate edicts, the historical development was: Originally,
someone stated that enforcement of strict liability against nautae was not harsh because
they can choose whether to undertake such responsibility. By the time of Ulpian, the
undertaking was implicit in the agreement of carriage. Ulpian repeated the justification
he had heard, but now it meant that nautae can choose whether to accept particular
passengers-an accurate statement, but a weak explanation for the imposition of strict
liability. The compilers then took this explanation and applied it to innkeepers in the
process of uniting the receptum edicts.
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when the decision to make no promise requires an express statement
of repudiation.
Second, recipere in the phrase ne quem recipiant is more likely
to refer to receiving than to promising, for it is part of a sentence
in which recipere is used to mean "receive" rather than "undertake
responsibility." The remainder of the sentence refers to conspiracy of
the operators with thieves against those whom they receive: "nisi hoc
esset statutum, materia daretur cum furibus aduersus eos quos recipiunt
coeundi"-"unless this provision were laid down, there would be given
the means for conspiring with thieves against those whom they receive. "106
The possibility of collusion with thieves exists whether the ship's master
or innkeeper expressly undertook to keep goods safe or not. Thus the
passage makes more sense if "recipere" refers to receiving persons and
their goods rather than undertaking responsibility for them.I07 But if
"recipere" means "receive" throughout the sentence, then the passage
states that the innkeeper or ship's master does not have to receive guests
or passengers.
2. Mistake in the Latin Text
A second alternative is to interpret the right to refuse to receive
anyone as a reference to the decision whether to get into the business
at all. "The glossators, followed by Cujas, Pothier, and Gluck, read
'neminem recipere' instead of 'ne quem recipiant.' In other words, seacarriers must carry for all who applied to them, but no one need be
a sea-carrier. "108 The suggestion neatly reconciles the conflicting passages
on the obligation to serve the public by denying that the first passage
deals with that obligation. It also is more consistent with the '·'innkeeper's
duty" paragraph, 0.47.5.1.6, that categorizes passengers with travelers
as persons for whom the operator is not liable in the action for theft.
Nevertheless, there is insufficient evidence that the Latin text was
altered. 109 The existence of a choice on whether to enter a business
is a weak basis for arguing that strict liability is not harsh. The better
explanation is that the phrase in question initially referred to the
discretion to make a promise; but if that explanation is correct, the
106. 0.4.9.1.1. I Watson, supra note 2 at 160.
107. If the ship's master undertook responsibility expressly for the goods of another,
it would be extraordinary to let him off. Fear of collusion with thieves would be unnecessary
to justify the receptum.
108. Stephen, supra note 88 at 136.
109. As discussed in part III, 0.47.5.1 is not really inconsistent on liability for
passenger's behavior, but simply refers to a different action. The only conflict in texts
deals with the innkeeper's obligation. There is no indication in the Digest that a ship's
master had an obligation to carry passengers. Thus, there is no greater reason to believe
the text here was inaccurate than that the text in 47.5 on innkeepers was inaccurate
or than that a mistake was made.
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Latin phrase would be ne quem and not the altered neminem.
Furthermore, if the carrier was required to serve all applicants, it would
be difficult for it to impose a waiver of liability. Yet the ·oigest makes
it clear that the carrier had that power.IIO

3. Innkeeper Choice Refers Only to Lodgers
A third reading reconciles the conflict by positing that the operator's
choice paragraph referred only to receiving lodgers. III The distinction
between lodgers and travelers is found in discussions of the actio furti
or damni a.n.c.s. at 0.47.5 and 4.9.6.3 where it is used as a rationale
for distinguishing for whose acts the innkeeper is liable.II2 But the
operator's choice paragraph deals with the actio de recepto and the
issue is not for whose acts but to which persons is the innkeeper liable.
There is nothing in the text of 0.4.9.1 to suggest that the discussion
is limited to lodgers and that the innkeeper would not be liable for
the losses of overnight guests. The rationale of fear of conspiracy to
rob applies equally well or better to the fears of travelers rather than
lodgers. In short, this theory had no good linguistic basis and is justified
only by assuming that the distinction drawn in 47.5 is correct and that
preserving it consistently must override all other considerations. The
specific references to lodgers are appropriate for the actio furti or damni
a.n.c.s., but the references in book 4 concerning the actio de recepto
cover all customers.

B. Reconciling Digest Language With the Right to Reject Travelers
Several alternative readings lead to an interpretation of the
innkeeper's duty paragraph, 0.47.5.1.6, as a reference to the desirability
110. 0.4.9.7pr. Perhaps a carrier could secure a liability waiver by lower prices,
but the hypothesis of a different charge where there was a guarantee of safekeeping
runs contrary to the tenor of passages stating that liability for goods attached even if
the owner paid no fee for their carriage. 0.4.9.4.2; 0.4.9.5pr; 0.4.9.6. But see LeonRobert Mc!nager, supra note 90 (citing 0.20.4.6.1 for the proposition that merchants
paid a higher price for the receptum, although that paragraph appears to refer to payments
for exertions to save cargo threatened with loss rather than payments for a guarantee
of safety).
Ill. "Guyet supposed the first passage referred to the persons 'qui habitandi causa
recipiuntur,' and the second to those 'qui hospitio recipiuntur.'" Stephen, supra note
88.
112. "The innkeeper is liable under the actio in factum on account of those who
are living in the inn. However, this does not relate to one who is received as a passing
guest, such as a traveler." But liability under the actio de recepto is specifically extended
to the acts of travelers-"uiatorum" by Gaius at 0.4.9.2. This contradiction in liability
is normally explained by finding Paul's statement to be a reference to the actio furti
a.n.c.s. and not to the actio de recepto.
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of taking in travelers and not to a legal obligation.IIJ First, the innkeeper
might not know anything about the stranger who appeared suddenly
at his door, and thus lacked information as a basis for choice. In this
sense, he would not be able to choose the traveler as he chose lodgers.
Second, the innkeeper could not refuse to give the traveler a room,
because it would undermine his business if individuals could not rely
upon getting accommodations there. Third, he is unable to refuse because
the "road agent" needs shelter and the innkeeper is under a moral
imperative to afford it. These readings show that the phrase does not
require the conclusion that the innkeeper is legally obligated to accept
travelers. Thus they support the proposition from the operator's choice
paragraph, 0.4.9.1, that there was no obligation under Roman law
for innkeepers to serve the public.II4
These attempts to interpret the phrase resolve the inconsistency
in statements on the duty to serve the public, but they create their
own problems. Innkeepers do know the identity of at least some recurring
travelers and thus would be able to make an informed choice on accepting
them. If occasional individuals were rejected, it might have only a
marginal effect on business. Without an advance reservation, no one
can rely on an inn being available rather than full. Thus, if an innkeeper
has a legal right to refuse a traveler, it seems unrealistic to say that
he cannot. Certainly "nee repel/ere potest iter agentes"-"he cannot refuse
the traveler" appears to go beyond a moral obligation. Although it
does not say he "may not" refuse the traveler, which would be most
appropriate for a legal limitation, even lawyers sometimes use "can"
in stating what the law allows and forbids.
C. The Absence of Law
Each of the foregoing explanations assumes that there was a rule
of law with respect to the innkeeper's obligation to accept travelers.
Yet the statement of the "rule" comes in the guise of premise for reasoning.
There are no other passages in the Digest on the obligation of carriers
to accept goods, though breach of such an obligation might be expected
to be a delict. In fact, the issue would be very unlikely to arise. The
113. "But the opinion usually accepted is, that Roman innkeepers and sea-carriers
were under no obligation to receive or carry for all who applied to them, and that
the 'nee repellere potest iter agentes' merely signified that such a course would be detrimental
from a business point of view." Stephen, supra note 88 at 136.
114. "At common law, the innkeeper was held to be exercising a public calling
and under a duty to receive all guests against whom no reasonable objection could be
. made. That was not the case at Roman law. Innkeepers could freely select their guests
as carriers could select the persons they wished to contract with. Indeed this choice
is given as the reason for imposing a specially grave burden upon them." Radin, supra
note 90 at 255.
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innkeeper has every incentive to accept the traveler if he has room.
A rejection would be upsetting, but it would not produce easily measured
monetary damages that would provide incentive for suit. The slim
likelihood of damages would not outweigh the disruption of travel plans
which would result if the excluded person sought redress in court. 115
The lack of any authoritative determination of the innkeepers'
responsibility to serve the public explains why the conflicting statements
in different books of the Digest were not reconciled. Justinian's scholars
working in different areas did not find any conflict with current law
because there was no current law. The statements of law on the actio
de recepto and the actio furti a.n.c.s. were accurate, and the assumption
used in reasoning was an incidental remark of little importance.
If there was no edict, it is unlikely that anyone could sue for damages
because they had been rejectea from an inn.II6 However, there may
have been enough uncertainty in the edict which gave rise to the action
for deliberate affronts (iniuria) to leave room for argument that the
action was available for rejection from an inn. 117 After all, if there
was room at the inn, exclusion would signify a personal revulsion that
could be seen as detrimental to an individual's reputation. Further,
the action lay where "one is not allowed to use the public baths or
to sit in a theater seat or to conduct business, to sit or converse in
some other such place, or to use his own property."118 This form of
iniuria dealt with third party interferences with conduct at a place where
one has a right to be, but it suggests the broader principle that there
were places from which people might not be barred without affront.
It might be argued that this should apply to inns, although inns were
not specifically discussed and the issue of its application had never
arisen.
If the compilers had been forced to confront the issue, they probably
would have found that innkeepers had no obligation to accept travelers.
Exclusion from an inn is just not sufficiently close to accepted incidents
of iniuria-the insult may not be public, the affront is based on inferences
from behavior rather than specific slander, and legal recognition of
exclusion as an insult would compel establishment of an involuntary
1

115. See Bruce Frier, Landlords and Tenants in Imperial Rome (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1980) pp. 48-52 (noting reasons for not bringing suit, including smallness
of sums involved where dispute is over short term rental).
116. It is possible, however, that municipal laws or innkeeper association by-laws
may have regulated inns and required the!!\ to serve all comers.
117. See Crook, supra note 27 at 250-55 (discussing the development of iniuria
from physical assault in the Twelve Tables through forcible entry on private premises
under the lex Cornelia and libel and slander by a senatusconsultum to the broad and
open language of the praetor's edict). The lex Cornelia did not allow suit because someone
invaded another's temporary lodgings, but this principle dealt only with the trespass
aspects of iniuria. 0.47.10.5.5.
118. D.47.10.13.7.
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relationship. Since the statement that innkeepers must accept travelers
was in the form of an explanation for a rule which was accurate, the
compilers did not focus on whether the explanation was the right rulein other words, they did not have any reason to pull together all passages
relating to the obligation to serve and try to make them consistent.
The only concern they had was whether the statement on the duty
to serve was incorrect. In the absence of any definitive ruling, there
was a sufficient argument for such a duty to prevent its unequivocal
rejection.
VI. Conclusion

The simple attempt to determine whether innkeepers in ancient
Rome had a legal obligation to accept travelers began with an apparent
conflict in the text of the Digest. Unraveling that conflict involved an
excursion into the development of Roman law, the way in which texts
were preserved and how the Digest was constructed. This exploration
concludes that the conflict resulted from the failure of the Roman jurists
to engage in just such an historical study. Instead, they tried to explain
the law on liability by extrapolations from other legal principles. This
abstract ahistorical reasoning produced confident statements of directly
opposite propositions on an undecided point, resulting in total confusion
in the Digest.
The power to reject customers is not a good reason for imposing
strict liability. The mistaken rationale in the Digest could have
discouraged the imposition of a duty to serve the public by fostering
a belief that a duty to serve the public requires lowering liability
standards. Similarly, the attribution offault to the operator of a business
in selecting employees could have preserved a penalty beyond its useful
period. The division and dissolution of the Roman empire, however,
prevented any further immediate development along these lines.
· This article not only points to the problems of ignoring history
in dealing with current issues, but it begins in one small area the process
of looking at historical development. The common law principle that
hotels, restaurants and common carriers have a status-based
responsibility to the public has been an important element in the
development of race relations law in the United States. 11 9 The Romans
probably would have decided in favor of the innkeeper's right to exclude
travelers from the inn. Although similarities between the common law
and Roman law can lead the scholar to find common sources for
119. See Note, "The Antidiscrimination Principle in the Common Law," 102 Harv.
L Rev. 1993 (1989); Randall Kennedy, "Martin Luther King's Constitution: A Legal
History of the Montgomery Bus Boycott," 98 Yale L J. 999 (1989); Heart of Atlanta
Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964);
The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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obligations, here it is the differences that provide insight. I 2o Roman
law reveals that the obligation of the innkeeper or the common carrier
to serve the public is not necessarily an integral part of their status.
The law may impose strict liability on innkeepers or carriers for loss
or damage of their customers' goods without requiring them to accept
all comers. Thus, the development of a common law obligation to serve
the public does not come from any universal principle, but it is rooted
in English experience during the middle ages where it first saw the .
light of day.

120. When Sir William Jones wrote his treatise on bailments in the eighteenth century,
he proposed to illustrate English law by a comparison with foreign law. William Jones,
An Essay on the Law of Bailments, Classics of English Legal History in the Modem
Era (London: C. Dilly, 1781 reprinted New York: Garland Publishing, Inc. 1978) p.
3. He contended that "a perfect harmony subsists on this interesting branch of jurisprudence
in the codes of nations most eminent for legal wisdom, particularly of the ROMANS
and the ENGLISH." /d. at II. "What is good sense in one age," he remarked, "must
be good sense, all circumstances remaining, in another." /d. at 14.
Several authors made the mistake of reading Jones' comments on the coincidence
of Roman law and English law as a statement that Roman law was the basis for English
law on bailments, including innkeepers. Radin, supra note 90 at 254; William L. Burdick,
The Principles of Roman Law (Rochester, N.Y.: Lawyers Cooperative Publishing Co.,
1938) p. 55. Justice Story also pointed to the Roman Law which made the innkeeper
liable for goods delivered to his keeping as the source of the common law of innkeeper
liability. J. Story, Commentaries on the Law of Bailments (5th ed., Boston: Little, Brown
Co., 1851) pp. 489-95. Indeed, Lord Holt in Coggs v. Bernard, 2 Ld. Ray. 909, 92
E.R. 107 (1703), analyzed the law of bailments based on Bracton [Henry de Bracton,
On the Laws and Customs of England (4 vols.; Samuel Thome, ed.,) 2:284-85.] who
in tum drew from Roman law. See Theodore F. T. Plucknett, A Concise History of
the Common Law (5th edition; Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1956) p. 264. Whether
English law on innkeepers was influenced by Roman law remains controversial: its main
features predate Holt's use of Bracton. At the least, Roman law illustrates some of the
legal issues involving innkeepers and provides a basis for comparison which assists in
understanding why English law developed as it did.
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